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CONCEPTS, ABILITIES AND PROPOSITIONS 
 
Hans-Johann GLOCK 
Zurich University 
Summary 
This article investigates whether the concept of a concept can be given a fairly 
uniform explanation through a ‘cognitivist’ account, one that accepts that con-
cepts exist independently of individual subjects, yet nonetheless invokes mental 
achievements and capacities. I consider various variants of such an account, 
which identify a concept, respectively, with a certain kind of abilitiy, rule and 
way of thinking. All of them are confronted with what I call the ‘proposition 
problem’, namely that unlike these explananda concepts are standardly regarded 
as components of propositions. The paper ends by suggesting that this problem 
can be resolved by recognizing the different ways in which concepts can be in-
volved in judgements or propositions, and by undermining the building-block 
model of concepts as abstract parts of abstract wholes. 
1.  The Project 
My aim is to elucidate the ordinary use or uses of the term ‘concept’, and 
those of its equivalents and cognates. This ordinary use includes everyday 
uses. As Ryle pointed out, however, the ordinary use which is important 
to philosophy also includes the established uses of terms in specialized 
forms of discourse, including technical uses (1971, 301–4). In the case of 
‘concept’, these special disciplines include the history of ideas, psychol-
ogy, logic and philosophy. 
These days many philosophers vehemently reject an interest in ordi-
nary language. Unfortunately, few of them provide arguments of any kind. 
A laudable exception to this rule is Christopher Peacocke. He rejects an 
investigation of the ordinary use of ‘concept’ on the grounds that it is 
‘something of a term of art’ which lacks ‘a unique sense that is theoreti-
cally important’. His evidence is a Woody Allen movie in which a charac-
ter from the entertainment industry says: ‘Right now, it’s only a notion, 
but I think I can get money to make it into a concept, and later turn it into 
an idea’ (Peacocke, 1992, 1–2). In my view, by contrast, the quote is 
funny precisely because it presupposes a distinction between concept, no-
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tion and idea that we do not recognize in everyday speech, and which we 
suspect to be obscure even to the speaker himself. What we should con-
cede is that the everyday use of ‘concept’ involves different strands, and 
this is even more obvious for its use in specialized disciplines. Further-
more, some of these uses may not just be distinct but downright incompat-
ible. That would be all the more reason, however, to disentangle these dif-
ferent strands. Furthermore, it is rare even for technical uses of ‘concept’ 
to be purely stipulative. For these uses are part of philosophical or psy-
chological theories that purport to explain cognitive and semantic phe-
nomena that can are commonly described with the help of the concept of a 
concept (concerning, e.g., cognitive development or synonymy). This 
makes it imperative to chart the similarities and differences between novel 
and established senses of the term, since we need to clarify whether the 
novel theories even address the phenomena they aspire to explain.1 
Like some related terms with a philosophical provenance—notably 
‘idea’—but unlike others—notably ‘universal’—‘concept’ is widely em-
ployed in everyday parlance. In many everyday contexts, moreover, ‘con-
cept’ means roughly: general term with a meaning. This definition also 
fits the role of ‘concept’ in logic in so far as concepts have an extension 
and are components of sentences (see below). Yet it does not capture cru-
cial uses in philosophy and psychology, where concepts are supposed to 
cut across different natural languages. In these contexts, ‘concept’ is more 
closely aligned with ‘idea’ than with ‘word’ or ‘term’. To be sure, a ven-
erable tradition reaching from Occam to Fodor would allow us to extend 
the definition to these uses, since it postulates a mental language that is 
shared by all creatures capable of conceptual thought. Elsewhere I have 
argued, however, that the idea of a universal language of thought is inco-
herent and that in their semantic capacity concepts are not themselves lin-
guistic symbols, but things represented or signified by such symbols 
(Glock, 2006, 45–8; 2009, 23–9). I shall not repeat this criticism here; 
instead I simply set aside concepts qua general terms for current purposes. 
At the same time, in pursuing the idea of concepts that transcend lan-
                                                      
1. But I shall ignore here to what extent the authors to which I attribute certain 
definitions need to pay heed to ordinary use for their own theoretical purposes. Accord-
ingly, pointing out that such a definition fails to capture ordinary use simply serves to ad-
vance my search for a definition that does, and is not necessarily meant as a criticism of 
the author to whom the unsuccessful definition is attributed. 
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guages, I shall concentrate on concepts expressed by general terms, which 
are sometimes called ‘predicative concepts’. 
It is relatively uncontroversial that such concepts are involved when 
rational creatures entertain thoughts like 
(1) Dogs bark. 
The nature of this involvement remains controversial, however. In the his-
tory of philosophy, one can distinguish three fundamental approaches to 
concepts. According to subjectivist conceptions, concepts are mental phe-
nomena, particular entities or goings-on in the mind or in the head of indi-
viduals. According to objectivist conceptions, concepts exist independ-
ently of human minds, as self-subsistent abstract entities. Finally, there is 
an intermediate position, which may be termed cognitivist.2 It agrees with 
objectivism in denying that concepts are mental particulars, while at the 
same time maintaining, with subjectivism, that they have an ineliminable 
mental or cognitive dimension. One version of cognitivism is intersubjec-
tivism. It holds that concepts exist independently of individual rational 
subjects, but insists that they are constituted by intersubjective linguistic 
practices. Another version brackets the question of existence, yet holds 
that what concepts are—their essence, if you wish—can be explained only 
by reference to the operations and capacities of rational subjects. It is this 
less committal idea that I seek to explore in this article. In sections 2 – 4 I 
discuss and ultimately reject the popular cognitivist proposal that concepts 
are simply identical with a certain kind of ability. Sections 5 – 6 consider 
three other cognitivist proposals, namely that concepts are identical, re-
spectively, with tools, techniques or rules, or ways of thinking. Section 7 
turns to a challenge confronting all four cognitivist proposals, which I call 
the proposition problem: unlike abilities, tools, techniques or rules and 
ways of thinking, concepts appear to be constituents of propositions. In 
section 8 I argue that the ultimate solution to this problem is to treat both 
propositions and concepts as logical constructions from conceptual abili-
ties. I end by indicating how concepts could be ways of thinking and yet 
                                                      
2. In previous publications I have used the label ‘pragmatism’, reluctantly follow-
ing the lead of Fodor. But ‘cognitivism’ avoids inapposite connotations. It is also superior 
to talk of ‘epistemic conceptions’, since not all conceptual judgement amounts to know-
ledge. 
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occur in propositions, and thereby suggest how seemingly incompatible 
features of the ordinary use of ‘concept’ might be reconciled.  
2. Concepts and abilities 
The most popular and perhaps the most natural version of cognitivism 
identifies concepts with abilities (See also Kenny, this volume). Thus, in 
response to the question ‘Are concepts entities or are they dispositions?’ 
Price states in no uncertain terms: ‘a concept is not an entity (...) but a dis-
position or capacity’ (1953, 320, 348). In the same vein Geach pronounces 
that concepts ‘are capacities exercised in acts of judgement’ (1957, 7, see 
also 13). This proposal respects several features of established use.  
First, properties are objective, something possessed by things of all 
kinds. By contrast, concepts are something possessed by rational subjects 
capable of classifying things according to their properties. This is simply a 
crucial aspect of the cognitive dimension of concepts stressed by cognitiv-
ism.3  
Secondly, the identification of concepts and capacities does not fall 
foul of the constraint that concepts must be shareable.4 As Geach points 
out, it does not entail that ‘it is improper to speak of two people as “hav-
ing the same concept” ’, since different individuals can possess the same 
mental capacities (1957, 14). Thirdly, concepts and abilities alike can be 
acquired, applied and lost, and some of them may be innate. 
Finally, to possess a concept is to possess a certain kind of mental abil-
ity, capacity or disposition. In what follows, I refrain from deciding which 
of these types of potentiality is the most appropriate general category (see 
Glock 2010b, sct. 5). Barring that issue, identifying concept-possession 
with an ability, capacity or disposition of some kind is inevitable.5 Con-
cepts are involved not just in occurrent thoughts or beliefs, but also in 
                                                      
3. The identification of concepts with properties is one of the most popular versions 
of objectivism. For a more elaborate critique of it see Glock 2010b. 
4. By contrast to those versions of subjectivism which treat concepts as mental par-
ticulars. See Glock 2009. 
5. That concept-possession is an ability of some kind is accepted, willy-nilly, even 
by Fodor, who purports to contradict cognitivism (a.k.a. ‘pragmatism’) on this issue (2003, 
p. 19). The real bone of contention between representationalists like Fodor and those cog-
nitivists that can properly be called ‘concept pragmatists’ in a wide sense—e.g. Wittgen-
stein, Ryle, Travis and Brandom—concerns the question of whether concept-possession is 
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also in long-standing or dispositional beliefs. Consequently, the posses-
sion of concepts must be at least as stable as the possession of disposi-
tional beliefs. Put in Aristotelian terms, concept-possession must be a po-
tentiality of some kind, since it combines two features. On the one hand, it 
is enduring rather than episodic. On the other hand, it is something which 
manifests itself in certain episodes, notably of overt or silent classification 
or inference. 
3.  The Individuation of Concepts and Abilities 
Its prima facie plausibility notwithstanding, the identification of concepts 
with abilities faces an objection concerning principles of individuation. 
Thus subjectivists like Fodor have alleged that concepts are more finely 
individuated than abilities. For instance, ‘creature with a kidney’ and 
‘creature with a heart’ apply to all and only the same things, but they ex-
press different concepts. Furthermore, ‘equilateral triangle’ and ‘equi-
angular triangle’ apply necessarily to the same things, yet they still ex-
press different concepts. In current jargon, concepts are not just ‘inten-
sional’ but ‘hyperintensional’. 
Now, an ability is individuated by reference to its exercise. But, Fodor 
maintains, the same sorting and inferential performances can manifest the 
possession of different concepts. Confining ourselves to the ability to sort 
or discriminate, sorting equilateral triangles from all other figures is also 
sorting equiangular triangles from all other figures (2003, 25–6, 143–6). It 
seems to follow that concepts cannot be individuated by the exercise of an 
ability, and hence that they cannot be individuated by reference to abili-
ties. In effect, Fodor’s objection runs as follows: 
P1:  Abilities are individuated by their exercise (ability to Φ = ability 
to Ψ iff Φing = Ψing). 
P2:  In all possible situations, one and the same sorting activity can 
manifest different concepts. 
                                                                                                                            
simply the ability to represent the property of being F or Fs as Fs, or whether it should be 
explained as the ability to classify things into those which are Fs and those which aren’t, or 
to draw inferences from thoughts about Fs. 
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C: Concepts cannot be individuated through the abilities which con-
stitute their possession. 
The argument is valid. Yet P2 is false: sorting triangles according to 
lengths is not the same activity as sorting triangles according to angles, 
even though the results are the same. The difference in the two activities 
can be displayed by linguistic creatures, who can justify their sorting 
along different lines. It can even be manifested in non-linguistic behav-
iour. A creature that sorts on account of measuring lengths applies equi-
lateral triangle, a creature that sorts on account of measuring angles ap-
plies equiangular triangle. These are different activities, manifesting dif-
ferent abilities and thereby the possession of different concepts. And it is 
obvious that one can have one of these abilities or concepts without hav-
ing the other. Indeed, most children actually learn how to measure lengths 
before learning how to measure angles. 
But individuation also poses another challenge to identifying concepts 
with abilities. Many cognitivists grant that there is no precise way of indi-
viduating abilities. Thus Travis (2000) grants that linking concepts to 
abilities may not be much help in individuating concepts, since it is not 
clear how abilities are to be counted.  That concession needs to be put in 
perspective, however. Like Travis, Geach (1957, 15) accepts that it is ab-
surd to ask how many abilities are exercised in a judgement. Yet he also 
insists, rightly, that we can still distinguish between such abilities. More 
generally, one must distinguish between the possibility of enumerating 
and the possibility individuating entities of a particular kind (see Strawson 
1997, ch. 1; Glock 2003, 47–52). And this general lesson applies equally 
to abilities. 
Still a problem remains. It is prima facie plausible to hold that we are 
able not only to distinguish the concept of a dog from that of barking, but 
also to specify that precisely two concepts are involved in judging that (1). 
So concepts and abilities seem to come apart on the issue of enumera-
bility. This verdict can be contested, however, on the grounds that it does 
not compare like with like. The claim that the number of concepts in-
volved in (1) is determinate is only even remotely plausible if we confine 
ourselves to predicative concepts (otherwise we have to add at least one 
quantitative concept that corresponds to the plural in English; alterna-
tively, if we analyse (1) with the help of Fregean logic, we need to add the 
logical concepts of universal quantification and of material implication). 
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But the very same consideration applies to abilities. It is just as plausible 
to insist that precisely two predicative abilities are involved in judging 
that (1)—namely that of thinking about dogs and that of thinking about 
things that bark—as it is to maintain that precisely two predicative con-
cepts are involved in (1). Accordingly, individuation is no obstacle to the 
idea that concepts are a kind of ability. 
4.  Differences between Concepts and Abilities 
Other weighty objections remain, however. The established use of ‘con-
cept’ differs from that of ‘ability’ in several respects. 
First, one thing we do with concepts is to define or explain them. But 
to define or explain a concept is not to define or explain a capacity. Nor-
mally, to explain an ability is to explain its causal preconditions (causal 
explanation), whereas to explain a concept is to explain its content (se-
mantic explanation). Furthermore, even when we define an ability (i.e. 
explain its content), we specify what it is an ability to do (this is the rea-
son why abilities are individuated through their exercise, as mentioned in 
sct. 3). By contrast, to explain a concept is to specify the conditions that 
an object must satisfy to fall under it. 
Secondly, and relatedly, concepts can be instantiated or satisfied by 
things; conversely, things instantiate, satisfy or fall under concepts. These 
things cannot be said of abilities, or at least not in the same sense. 
Thirdly, and once more relatedly, concepts have an extension (the set 
of objects which fall under them) and an intension (the features which 
qualify objects for falling under them); yet this cannot be said of abilities. 
Insofar as the ability linked to possessing the concept F has an extension, 
it is not the range of things that are F, but either the range of subjects that 
possess F, or the range of situations in which these possessors can apply 
or withhold F. 
Fourthly, a concept can occur in a proposition or statement, but an 
ability cannot. Of course, abilities can occur in propositions in the sense of 
being mentioned in them, as in  
(2) The ability to lie convincingly is a great asset in business. 
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But it seems that concepts occur in propositions in yet another and more 
pervasive way, not just as topics or referents, something the proposition is 
about, but as components. The concept of being sweet occurs in the 
proposition that 
(3) Sugar is sweet 
even though no ability occurs in it. 
5. Tools, Techniques and Rules 
At this point it behoves us to return to the issue of concept possession, 
since it provides the strongest argument in favour of the identification 
(I) To possess a concept = to possess an ability. 
But one cannot simply apply the general principle  
(II) having x = having y ⇒ x = y 
to this case. For it remains an open question whether (I) cannot be glossed 
as: 
(I') S has the concept F ⇔ S has the ability of operating with F. 
Of course, someone who identifies concepts with abilities will resist that 
paraphrase and insist that the ability with which possessing the concept F 
is to be identified must be explained without mention of the concept F, an 
entity with which the subject operates. But it is an option that she has not 
ruled out. We need to consider the following alternative to identifying 
concepts with abilities. If having a concept is an ability, it is an ability to 
operate with concepts. In that case, however, the concept itself cannot be 
identical with the ability. Rather, it is something employed in the exercise 
of that ability. 
A cognitivist conception which picks up this cue is the popular idea 
that concepts are a kind of cognitive or linguistic tool. Concepts are things 
employed in the exercise of conceptual abilities, just as tools are things 
employed in the exercise of manual (technical) abilities. 
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Unfortunately, it is far from clear what kind of tool concepts might be. 
Worse still, the analogy is misleading to begin with. The idea that con-
cepts are akin to tools in that they are objects (concrete, mental or ab-
stract) with which we operate in conceptual thought amounts to a reifica-
tion. There is a difference between the possession of a tool and the posses-
sion of the ability to employ the tool—as I keep discovering to my cost 
when trying to operate with our electric drill.  This distinction cannot be 
drawn in the case of concepts. To possess a concept is ipso facto to pos-
sess the ability to use the concept. 
A third cognitivist account promises to heed that point. It maintains 
that a concept is not an object, properly speaking, but a technique. Thus 
Wittgenstein maintained that ‘a concept is a technique of using a word’, or 
‘the technique of our use of an expression: as it were, the railway network 
that we have built for it’ (1988: 50 and 2000: MS 163: 56v).6 To master or 
possess a technique is to master or possess an ability. Yet techniques are 
not themselves abilities, but something which the possessor of an ability 
uses in exercising the ability. There is a difference, for instance, between 
the ability to skin a rabbit and the various techniques one might employ to 
this end. 
Wittgenstein regarded concepts as linguistic techniques. But his idea 
can be given a Kantian twist, in order to avoid the potentially problematic 
implication that concepts are the prerogative of linguistic creatures. One 
can tie concepts in the first instance to thought or understanding rather 
than language. Concepts are techniques not just for using words, but for 
mental operations or mental acts which may or may not be expressed in 
language. The capacity for such mental operations may presuppose pos-
session of language, yet it can be exercised by a subject that does not en-
gage in either overt or silent speech at the time. 
But what kind of mental operation? A plausible answer is that concep-
tual thought revolves around classification and inference. Accordingly, the 
proposal currently under consideration is this: a concept is not identical 
with the capacity to classify or infer, but only with the technique em-
ployed by someone who exercises the ability to classify or infer. Next, the 
term ‘technique’ needs to be made more specific, in line with both Kant 
and Wittgenstein. In so far as conceptual thought involves a technique, it 
                                                      
6. For Wittgenstein’s approach to concepts see Glock 2010c; concerning the ques-
tion whether concept-possession requires linguistic capacities see Glock 2010a. 
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is a technique of operating according to a rule or principle. Concepts, the 
proposal now runs, are rules or principles of classification and/or infer-
ence. 
Even this modified proposal is threatened by category mismatches. It 
does not seem that to define a concept is to define a principle or rule. Ra-
ther, the principle or rule features in the definition. On the other hand, 
perhaps this is just a vagary of the current use of ‘definition’ in English, 
without further conceptual import. There is no linguistic infelicity in 
maintaining that to explain a concept is to explain a principle or rule for 
performing certain mental or linguistic operations. 
Another qualm would be that principles can be true or false, whereas 
concepts cannot. Prima facie, at least, rules escape this difficulty, in so far 
as they are expressed by sentences in the imperative rather than indicative 
mood. Note, however, that this exemption does not even hold for all regu-
lative rules, not to mention constitutive rules. Thus a regulative rule of the 
form 
(4) x ought to Φ in condition C 
can be prefixed by ‘it is true that …’ (See Glock 2005). 
Furthermore, the question arises what form these principles or rules 
should take. Here we seem to be facing a dilemma. One option is that 
these rules are standards for the employment of concepts. They might, for 
instance, take the form of the rules Bennett extracts from Kant (Bennett, 
1966, 145): 
(5) You may apply concept F to x iff x is …  
In that case the concept F itself is not identical with the rule. It is rather a 
kind of mental predicate the use of which is governed by the rule. 
A second option is that the rule specifies another activity, e.g. 
(6)  You may treat x in way W iff x is … . 
In that case the danger is that we are stuck with two unpalatable options. 
One is that W is a place-holder for practical activities which may presup-
pose concept-possession, but which someone who has mastered the con-
cept need not engage in; the other is that W is a place-holder for concep-
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tualization or classification, which would render the account unexplana-
tory. 
6.  Ways of Thinking 
Ultimately, any cognitivist account of concepts must show that this di-
lemma is apparent rather than real. Or so I shall argue in the next section. 
First, however, I briefly want to consider a version of cognitivism that 
prima facie avoids this challenge. It is the Neo-Fregean proposal—
epitomized by Peacocke and Künne—that concepts are senses or ‘modes 
of presentation’. Unfortunately, the latter is no more than a catch-phrase, 
and one Frege himself never elaborated, least of all with respect to con-
cepts, which he regarded as referents rather than senses of predicates. But 
we can put some flesh on it by treating concepts as ways of thinking about 
objects, though not in the adverbial sense of thinking about them hard or 
longingly. More specifically, concepts are ways of thinking about or con-
ceiving of objects as possessing certain properties, without themselves 
being properties. To render that suggestion viable, we need to avoid literal 
interpretations of the Fregean idea that a sense is a mode of presenting a 
referent. Strictly speaking, there can be no way of presenting a referent 
unless there is a referent or extension. In the case of concepts, this would 
rule out uninstantiated concepts, which is absurd. On my construal, there-
fore, ways of thinking about objects are directed not just at those objects 
which possess the relevant properties, but at all objects of which the rel-
evant properties can be predicated either truly or falsely. To put it differ-
ently, a concept is a way of thinking of objects from a suitable range as 
possessing or lacking certain properties. This reintroduces the idea of 
classification. Finally, we can operationalize the idea of ways of thinking, 
thereby further spelling out its cognitive dimension. The concept ex-
pressed by a predicate is determined by the features to which the subject 
refers in deciding whether a given objects falls under the concept, or 
would decide, if the question arose.7 
                                                      
7. For a more elaborate discussion of Neo-Fregeanism see Glock 2011. 
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7.  The Proposition Problem 
Unsurprisingly, given their intellectual roots, the Neo-Fregeans emphasize 
the role of concepts in logic, or, more generally, in inferences, whether 
these be formally or materially valid. Concepts are, among other things, 
components of propositions. Nonetheless they have the same difficulty 
here as other cognitivist positions. At least prima facie, like abilities, prin-
ciples or rules but unlike concepts, ways of thinking do not occur in all 
propositions, but only in those which are about them, i.e. explicitly men-
tion or refer to them. 
How can concepts be both ways of thinking and components of propo-
sitions? There are two ways of responding to this challenge, which are 
associated, respectively, with the figureheads of Strawson and Wittgen-
stein. I shall argue that in combination, these responses promise to resolve 
the ‘proposition problem’, which would otherwise seem intractable. 
If Strawson is to be trusted, universals like properties can enter a 
proposition not just in the direct sense that the sentence expressing the 
proposition contains words or phrases referring to the property of being F, 
but also in the less direct sense that the sentence contains words or phrases 
signifying them (See Strawson 1959, Part II). By a similar token, that sen-
tence contains general terms expressing the concept F, even though it does 
not refer to them. Finally one can extend this courtesy to any otherwise 
plausible explanans of ‘concept’. Sticking to the Neo-Fregean proposal, 
this would mean that the predicate in (3) expresses a way of thinking 
about, or of, substances, namely as possessing the property of being 
sweet. 
Crucial to this construal is that standard propositions, and by implica-
tion our common or garden thinking, are not about concepts. That insight 
seems to go back at least as far as Aquinas, on Kenny’s interpretation in 
any case. Ideas (species) are ‘not what is thought of (id quod intelligitur) 
but that by which thinking takes place (id quo intelligitur)’ (Kenny, 1980, 
71). It is also accepted by Price, who identifies concepts with capacities: 
‘The concept is not before the mind as an object of inspection. It is at 
work in the mind, but not as one inspectable content among others … It 
shows itself not as a detectable item of mental furniture, but rather as a 
guiding force, determining the direction which the series of presented par-
ticulars [mental images or words] takes …’ (1953, 342). And it is congen-
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ial to the Neo-Fregeanism propounded by Künne. In the spirit of Straw-
son, Künne distinguishes between application, signification and expres-
sion: the general term ‘dog’ applies to all and only dogs, connotes the 
property of being a dog, and expresses the concept of being a dog (2005, 
254 and fn. 31, 263; see also his 2003, 4). 
Some such distinction is prerequisite for capturing the different seman-
tic properties or dimensions of general terms. Nonetheless the Strawson–
Künne solution to the proposition problem immediately faces two chal-
lenges.  
First, can’t the courtesy of being allowed to enter into a proposition in-
directly be extended from ways of thinking to all otherwise plausible can-
didates for being concepts, notably abilities or rules? Secondly, why 
should one accept that any of these candidates feature in all propositions, 
however indirectly? 
The answer to the first question is straightforward in so far as we stick 
to the relationship between concepts and general terms. It is perfectly 
commonplace to speak of words as expressing concepts. And there is no 
violent infelicity in speaking of general terms as expressing ways of think-
ing. The same goes for rules of classification and/or inference. Perhaps 
one of these notions—‘ways of thinking’ or ‘rule’—comes closer to cap-
turing the ordinary meaning of ‘concept’, yet it is not on account of the 
possibility of being expressed by general terms. By contrast, it is at best 
misleading to speak of general terms as expressing an ability. Conceptual 
abilities are possessed by cognitive subjects, and they are expressed—in 
the sense of being manifested—by the mental activities—notably the 
judgements and inferences—of such subjects. And we might say that 
those activities manifest concepts indirectly, keeping this relation apart 
from the expression of concepts by general terms. The notion of a concep-
tual ability points to the subject of conceptual thought and to the activity 
(in a suitably loose sense of the term) of conceptual thinking. By contrast, 
it is out of place when it comes to the content of conceptual thought, 
which is precisely what the idea of concepts as components of proposi-
tions points to. What we still need is a way of reconciling the mental or 
cognitive dimension of concepts with the objective dimension suggested 
by their occurrence in propositions. 
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8.  Propositions and Concepts as Logical Constructions 
This takes us straight to the second challenge. The Strawson–Künne re-
sponse at best removes an obstacle to claiming that concepts can be ways 
of thinking and yet appear in propositions. But what positive reasons do 
we have for accepting that ways of thinking appear in propositions, let 
alone as components of propositions? The answer, I submit, is that both 
propositions and their components are logical constructions out of the 
practices and abilities of concept-exercising creatures. 
In this article I can only go some way towards justifying that answer. 
A first step consists in scrutinizing the idiom of concepts as ‘components’ 
of propositions in a Wittgensteinian spirit. Perhaps that idiom is mislead-
ing and we need to unearth its underlying function. 
What is the rationale for speaking about concepts and propositions and 
for parsing propositions into concepts? These notions are helpful in ac-
counting for facts like the following: first, different people can think the 
same thing—that is, share the same thoughts; secondly, they can entertain 
thoughts which, though different, stand in logical relations to each other; 
thirdly, they can do both of these things without sharing a language. When 
a monoglot Anglophone A and a monoglot Germanophone B both believe 
that 
(7) Cats are animals 
then they share a thought. Similarly, if A believes that 
(8) Cats are mammals 
and B believes that 
(9)  Cats are vertebrates 
then what B believes follows from what A believes. These facts are easily 
explained in terms of propositions and concepts. A and B can both believe 
that (7) because they have both mastered the concepts that occur in (7), 
irrespective of the fact that they express them through different words 
(e.g. ‘animal’ vs. ‘Tier’). What A believes entails what B believes because 
of the relations that obtain between the concepts that occur in (8) and (9). 
All of which is in no way undermined by the fact that A and B would ex-
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press these propositions and concepts through different words (e.g. ‘ani-
mal’ vs. ‘Tier’). 
Now, the most straightforward explanation of these features appears to 
be ‘the building-block model’ of propositions and concepts.8 According to 
this model what a subject believes (the  content of A’s belief) is a proposi-
tion or thought, a complex (abstract) object of which concepts are the 
components; thus the thought that dogs bark is a complex abstract object 
of which the concepts DOG and BARK are abstract parts. By a similar 
token, what a subject has (A’s state of believing) is a mental process of 
accepting the whole proposition, and thinking one of the component con-
cepts is a stage in this process; thus to believe that dogs bark, A must first 
think DOG and then BARK. In summary, if A believes that p, then she 
stands in a relation of grasping and accepting an abstract entity, a proposi-
tion, of which concepts are (equally abstract) components. It follows that 
one cannot grasp or accept the whole proposition without having or grasp-
ing its constituent concepts. 
Its popularity notwithstanding, however, the building-block model is 
problematic. There are both empirical and conceptual qualms about the 
idea that entertaining the part of a thought correlates with a definite stage 
of a more protracted mental or neuro-physiological process—the enter-
taining of the whole thought. Even if these could be waved, we would 
only be dealing with stages of thinking a thought, not with stages of 
thoughts. As regards the latter, the building-block model transposes the 
part/whole relation from the spatial and temporal sphere to a sphere—that 
of abstract entities—to which, ex hypothesis, neither spatial nor temporal 
notions apply. What seems to give sense to talk of parts and wholes in the 
case of propositions or thoughts is the fact that the linguistic expressions 
of thoughts—namely sentences—have components—namely words (see 
Kenny 1989, 126–7). What is said or thought has genuine components to 
the extent to which its linguistic expression has components (which may, 
for instance, be explained when A is called upon to state and explain what 
she believes).  
Following Quine, many philosophers regard propositions as dubious 
entities. They are not just abstract objects, but intensional, and hence, al-
legedly, lack criteria of identity. Such philosophers often replace proposi-
                                                      
8. As far as I can tell, the dismissal phrase ‘building-block theory’ goes back to 
Davidson. See his 1984, 4, 220. 
 
 
 16 
tions by sentences as the objects of propositional arguments. I am more 
inclined to challenge an assumption which the orthodox view shares with 
its nominalist-cum-extensionalist critics, namely that intentional verbs 
signify relations to either abstract or concrete objects. The idea of proposi-
tional attitudes is problematic not just on account of ‘propositional’ but 
also on account of ‘attitudes’. For the idea that belief is a relation between 
a subject and an entity amounts to a reification. 
Admittedly, noun-clauses like ‘that the cat went up the oak tree’ or 
‘what Carl believes’ are grammatically speaking the objects of beliefs. 
But they are intentional rather than object-accusatives (White 1972). 
(10) Clare Short believes Tony Blair 
entails that there is an object x such that Short believes x. In (10) the psy-
chological verb expresses a genuine relation, since here two relata must 
exist, one to believe, and one to be believed. By contrast,  
(11) Short believes that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction. 
does not entail that there is an object x such that Short believes x. Nothing 
in reality need correspond to the noun-phrase of (11), since the relevant 
state of affairs need not exist or obtain. 
A defender of the building-block model might dig his heels in and in-
sist that something must exist, namely a propositional content which is a 
real object, though an abstract one. But this ‘something’ is a grammatical 
projection from that-clauses rather than a genuine object.9 Brentano was 
right to insist that to believe is to believe something. (11) entails that there 
is something Short believes. Yet in the first instance this simply means 
that Short cannot believe anything unless there is an intelligible answer to 
the question ‘What does Short believe?’ Furthermore, the wh-clause ‘what 
Short believes’, like ‘what Short weighs’, incorporates an interrogative 
rather than a relative pronoun. Thus ‘Prescott knows the person Short be-
lieves’ and ‘The person Short believes is Blair’ together entail ‘Prescott 
knows Blair’. Yet ‘Prescott knows what Claire Short believes’ and ‘What 
Short believes is that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction’ do not 
                                                      
9. Pace Quine, the term ‘something’ is wider than ‘object’. ‘Something’ is syntacti-
cally transcategorial: it can quantify into the positions of singular term, predicate, and sen-
tence. Only in the first case is it equivalent to ‘object’. For the complex relations between 
these expressions, as well as ‘exists’, ‘there is’ and ‘real’, see Glock 2003, 52-63. 
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entail ‘Prescott knows that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction’, if 
only because one cannot know a falsehood. Similarly, ‘Prescott knows 
what Short weighs’ and ‘Short weighs 70 kg’ do not entail ‘Prescott 
knows 70kg’, since that sentence is ungrammatical. Neither ‘what Short 
weighs’ nor ‘what Short believes’ signify an object to which Short is re-
lated. By the same token, believing that p is no more a genuine relation to 
an object than weighing n kilograms. 
It might be objected that there are pertinent contexts in which ‘what 
Short believes’ incorporates a relative pronoun. In conjunction with (11) 
(12) Prescott believes what Short believes  
entails 
(13) Prescott believes that Iraq possesses weapons of mass destruction. 
But (12) is not underwritten by our knowledge that Short and Prescott are 
related in the same way to an entity beyond space and time, whatever that 
might mean. It is underwritten by the fact that both share certain proper-
ties regarding a particular question, namely the question of whether Iraq 
possesses weapons of mass destruction. Even in this context, ‘what Short 
believes’ is an interrogative clause in a less direct sense, since its sense 
derives from the way in which Short would or could respond to a certain 
question, or react in certain situations, e.g. when it comes to approving the 
attack on Iraq in Parliament. 
That different people A and B can think the same thought or hold the 
same belief does not mean that there is an abstract object to which they 
severally stand in the relation of thinking, believing, saying, etc. It just 
means that both A and B believe that snow is white; that is to say, what 
they both believe can be expressed by the same declarative sentence. If A 
and B are to disagree, what A says or asserts must be what B denies. But 
this does not commit one to the existence of self-subsistent entities be-
yond space and time, but only to the conceptual truism that if B denies 
what A asserts, and A asserts that p, then B denies that p. 
The building-block model also goes astray in assuming that the alleged 
objects to which subjects of belief are related are propositions. Many in-
tentional verbs cannot be characterised as expressing a relation either to a 
proposition or to a sentence. It makes no sense to expect, fear or hope a 
sentence or proposition, at least not in the same sense as to expect, fear or 
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hope that p. And given that what I can suspect is what you can believe, 
this difficulty may be contagious. That is to say, it may show that even 
though it makes sense to believe the proposition that p, believing that p is 
not the same as believing the proposition that p. 
One might respond that in its philosophical usage, ‘proposition’ is a 
term of art which is exempted from the vagaries of certain intentional 
verbs in English that rule out locutions like 
(14) A fears/expects/hopes the proposition that p. 
But this invites the challenge to explain what precisely that technical term 
means. And because of the illicitness of (14) that challenge cannot be met 
by stipulating that propositions are simply what we believe, expect, hope, 
etc.  
The denial that what we believe is always a proposition seems to im-
ply, however, that in cases in which we do believe the proposition that p, 
we have two beliefs, the belief that p and the belief in the proposition that 
p. But this objection can be fended off as follows. To say that A believes 
the proposition that p is not to ascribe to her a belief in addition to her be-
lief that p. Rather, it is to place her belief that p in a certain context. Be-
lieving that p is simply a matter of believing something to be so, whereas 
believing the proposition that p is a matter of believing something to be 
true. In the case of simply believing, the focus is on how things are or 
might be, in the case of believing a proposition, on how they have or 
might be stated or believed to be (see Rundle 2001). 
9. Conclusion 
The measurement analogy does not just pinpoint a weakness in the build-
ing-block model of belief, it also promises to furnish the basis for a cogni-
tivist alternative. (On the measurement analogy see Beckermann 1996.) 
When we ascribe a weight to a person, we do not ascribe to them a genu-
ine relation to an abstract object. Rather, we ascribe to the person a rela-
tion to other material objects, for instance that of being in balance with a 
cube which contains 60 litres of water. Mutatis mutandis for the case of 
belief. In ascribing a belief to a person, we ultimately describe and explain 
their actual or possible behaviour. We place the subject not in a relation to 
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a genuine object, but in the context of a system of describing and explain-
ing the subject’s behaviour and behavioural capacities. In the final analy-
sis, talk about propositions and concepts is to be elucidated in terms of 
what subjects think or say, or, more accurately still, could think or say. 
Although propositions are not themselves linguistic entities, they are 
akin to  what Prior called logical constructions from linguistic phenom-
ena, namely from the that-clauses by which we report and refer to what 
people say or think (Prior 1971, ch. 2). The criteria of identity for proposi-
tions make essential references to linguistic acts (sayings or utterances). 
There are propositions no one has ever uttered or thought of. But what 
distinguishes two such propositions is evident from the declarative sen-
tences which express them. Although our criteria of identity for proposi-
tions are not the same as our criteria of identity for sentences, we can only 
identify the former because we can identify the latter. Although there are 
different linguistic expressions for the most important truth discovered by 
Newton and the most important truth discovered by Einstein, what distin-
guishes these two truths is evident from their expressions—‘F = ma’ and 
‘E = mc2’.  
At this juncture a satisfactory solution to the proposition problem re-
quires a detailed logical construction of talk about both propositions and 
concepts out of talk about the abilities of rational subjects. Although I do 
not know of any entirely convincing execution of this programme, there 
are several noteworthy attempts;10 and I myself have contributed to the 
project by blocking possible objections (1997; 2006, 53–7). Assuming the 
feasibility of the cognitivist explanation, let us return to the proposition 
problem from the perspective of the measurement analogy. In what sense 
can ways of thinking occur in propositions? The answer is, very roughly: 
in the sense that S can only think that a is F if S has the capacity to think 
about objects as being F. Propositions are what is or can be said or 
thought. Concepts are ways in which subjects do or could conceive of 
properties. 
To talk of propositions and concepts is not just a façon de parler, on 
this view, and propositions and concepts are not just ‘make-believe enti-
ties’ (to use what is indeed a currently fashionable façon de parler). Ra-
ther, they are logical constructions in a non-reductive sense. It may prove 
                                                      
10. In addition to the aforementioned measurement analogy and to Prior’s own ac-
count, see, e.g., Sellars 1963; von Savigny 1983; Brandom 1998; Dolby 2007. 
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impossible to paraphrase concepts away. We may need to refer to them in 
order to describe the practices of creatures with highly evolved cognitive 
and/or linguistic abilities. At the same time, the existence and nature of 
concepts, as well as their individuation, becomes unmysterious once their 
role within that practice and its description is understood. It is only pos-
sible to state what propositions and concepts are in terms which implicitly 
refer to what people say or do; and we identify propositions and concepts 
by grouping or classifying actual or potential token-expressions according 
to what they say or mean. On this basis we may at least hope to reconcile 
two apparently incompatible features of the ordinary use of ‘concept’, the 
cognitive dimension and the appearance in propositions.11 
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